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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical model to investigate the e¤ect of heterogeneous ideolog-
ical preferences over the public provision of goods on both the scope of government spending
and the electoral competition among political parties. The proposed model points out that the
presence of both ideological politicians who compete for o¢ ce and electoral uncertainty gener-
ate a partisanship e¤ect on economic policy. In particular, pro-market (right-wing) politicians
commit to lower public provision of goods and income taxation schedules that implement larger
income inequality than pro-government (left-wing) politicians. The model also predicts that the
public funding of goods through income taxation confers an electoral advantage to pro-market
ideological positions. In fact, pro-market politicians can court moderate pro-leftist voters by
promises of higher net income that pro-government politicians are not willing to fund. As a
result, a right-wing party exhibits larger chances of winning elections, and its policy proposal
determines lower ideological sacrice than for the left-wing party.
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence shows that individuals broadly disagree on the extent of government provision
of goods and services such as health care coverage and education. This heterogeneity of individuals
positions on the economic role of government can arise because of either di¤erent views on how soci-
ety should work or diverse perceptions on the relative merits of governments and markets (Bénabou
2008).1For instance, some citizens believe that society should rely on individual responsibility and
advocate for a reduced involvement of government in the economy. This ideological view considers
that individuals should be free to choose their doctors, health insurance plan and the school of
their children in private markets. Perceptions and beliefs over the benets of competitive markets
may also justify positions against government intervention. Individuals who perceive that markets
work properly, or at least better than the public sector, would limit the scope of government to the
provision of pure public goods such as national defense or property rights protection. On the other
side, equality of opportunities claims are often argued by individuals who believe that all citizens
have right to a¤ordable health care and education, universal access to which should be guaranteed
by governments.2
Whichever set of subjective beliefs and perceptions individuals hold, it constitutes economic ide-
ology about the proper role of government providing goods and services. These ideologies translate
into heterogeneous policy preferences over the resources that governments must devote to nance
the public provision of goods. Besides the ideological conict on the extent of government provi-
sion of goods, there emerges conict of interest to decide who bear the cost of funding these goods.
Indeed, it is not possible to ignore the level of public provision of goods in the analysis of the e¤ect
of taxation schedules on the private well-being of citizens. Citizens care about their own economic
well-being and therefore support taxation policies that redistribute income towards them. Thus,
examining the ideological conict on the economic role of government also requires to consider the
distributive conict generated by the possibility of income redistribution. This paper presents a
theoretical model to examine how representative democracies make redistributive and allocation
policy decisions in the presence of these conicts of interests.
In representative democracies conicts of interests among individuals are channelled through
elections, where citizens choose among political parties who will then be in charge of economic
policy. Nevertheless, political parties competing for o¢ ce also exhibit conicting views over policy
outcomes because they are composed of politicians who are also citizens with their own partisan
1 International surveys report both the persistence over time and the signicant large disparity in citizenseconomic
beliefs across and within countries (see for instance The World Values Survey). For the particular case of beliefs on
the relative merits of governments and markets, the International Pew Research Survey (2007) documents di¤erent
views about the extent of free-market beliefs and the economic role of government around the World.
2Public intervention is also supported by individuals who believe that market failures are specially common in
markets for health and education. For instance, the existence of asymmetric information in health care insurance
markets which creates moral hazard and adverse selection; the spillover e¤ects and externalities generated by educa-
tion; or the presence of capital market imperfections such as liquidity constraints that limit the access to some goods
for low income individuals. See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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preferences (Wittman 1977, 1983; Alesina 1988; Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate
1997). On the other side, political need to obtain the support of a majority of citizens to be elected
and, therefore, electoral incentives must also be considered in the analysis of partisan competition
among politicians (Calvert 1985). For these reasons, this research examines the e¤ect of conicting
partisan politicians running for o¢ ce on allocation and income redistribution policies. This paper
also investigates whether the strategic use of income redistribution to court groups of voters a¤ects
both the scope of government spending and the extent of electoral competition among partisan
politicians.
In order to investigate the simultaneous e¤ect of ideological political parties and electoral in-
centives on both allocation and redistribution policies, this paper develops an electoral competition
model with partisan politicians and probabilistic voting. The analysis considers an economy in
which citizens belong to groups that are associated to levels of gross income obtained by individ-
uals in a market economy. Through an electoral process citizens choose a government that can
redistribute income among groups through tax-transfers schedules and fund the provision of goods
with revenues raised by income taxation. There are no constraints in the available income taxa-
tion schedules that government can use (i.e. non-linear schedules are feasible), and these schedules
do not distort economic decisions that create deadweight losses. This simplifying assumption is
made in order to better isolate the e¤ect of partisan preferences on public provision of goods and
income redistribution. The government is elected from two partisan political parties, right and
left, that compete for o¢ ce. Right-wing (left-wing) party holds pro-market (pro-government) ide-
ological views and advocates for a reduced (signicant) public provision of goods. In spite of their
partisan views, parties can credibly commit to policy platforms that depart from their ideological
positions, and they can have private benets associated to winning elections. When choosing their
vote, individuals care about the e¤ect of policy platforms on both their net income and the public
provision of goods over which they exhibit heterogeneous views. These partisan positions on public
provision of goods are represented by satiable Euclidean preferences and, therefore, the well-being
of ideological individuals decreases when policies depart from their desired levels of public provi-
sion. Citizens also consider the relative valence or popularity of parties running for o¢ ce. The
realization of this valence is unknown by parties when choosing their policy platforms, and that
creates uncertainty about the electoral outcome (i.e. probabilistic voting). Every citizen votes for
the party that provides her larger well-being given policy platforms and partiesvalence, and the
winner party attracts the majority of the votes and implements the committed economic policies.
The proposed model provides interesting new insights on the e¤ect of partisan positions on
redistributive and allocation policies. The model rst shows that the presence of both ideological
politicians (who compete for o¢ ce) and uncertainty about the electoral outcome generates a parti-
sanship e¤ect on economic policy (i.e. policy divergence). The pro-government party o¤ers larger
public provision of goods than the right-wing party which holds pro-market ideological positions.
On the other side, income taxation schedules proposed by parties aim to maximize their electoral
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returns. As we learnt from distributive politics literature (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and
Londregan 1996), electoral incentives make politicians redistribute income toward groups with lower
gross income and more pivotal voters who are most likely to change their vote. Despite the fact
that both parties have incentives to favor the same groups of voters, the right-wing party can tar-
get larger net income to all groups because it commits to a lower direct provision of goods. The
analysis underlines that the strategic courting of voters leads to fund the public provision of goods
by reducing in larger proportion the net income of groups with more resources (always assuming a
balanced budget). Given that a left-wing party commits to higher provision of goods, it commits
to income taxation schedules that implement lower income inequality than that proposed by the
right-wing party. Hence, in spite of politicians who do not exhibit partisan preferences over the
distribution of income, the model predicts that net income inequality depends on partiespartisan
positions over public provision of goods.
Interestingly, the main novel contribution of this paper shows how the presence of partisan
preferences over economic policies can a¤ect the scope of political competition among political
parties. Departing from a symmetric distribution of ideological preferences in which neither party
has an advantage, the model predicts an asymmetric equilibrium in which one ideological position
exhibits electoral advantage. In particular, the electoral race is conditioned because, in an economy
with resource scarcity, citizens are willing to trade their partisan views over public provision of
goods in exchange for increases of net income. Then, pro-market politicians can court moderate
pro-leftist citizens who could swing their vote by strategically targeting larger promises of income
that pro-government politicians are not willing to fund. As a result, the political redistribution
of income allows pro-market ideological positions to exhibit larger chances of winning elections.
The analysis also shows that this advantage leads the left-wing party to support larger ideological
sacrice because risk aversion makes it to reduce the proposal of public funding of goods, in order
to try to prevent the victory of the ideological positions of its opponent.
Several political economy contributions have analyzed the e¤ect of electoral incentives on the
size and scope of government (Persson and Tabellini 1999, 2000; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Milessi-
Ferreti et al. 2002). These contributions assume that voters have homogeneous preferences over
policy and politicians uniquely care about winning elections. Under these assumptions, electoral
competition leads politicians to announce the same combination of public goods and redistributive
transfers that maximizes their chances of being elected. However, economic policy convergence
predicted by this literature is refused by empirical evidence (Besley and Case 2003). In particular,
empirical research for the US shows that politicianspartisan preferences a¤ect policy outcomes
at federal and state levels of government (Lee, Moretti and Butler 2004; Bartels 2008).3In order
3Besley and Case (2003) reports that the larger the fraction of Democrat party seats in the state legislature is, the
larger the state spending per person; Lee et al. (2004) show the highly partisan voting behavior of legislators in the
US Congress; Bartels (2008) nds out a signicant partisanship e¤ect in the American redistributive policy between
Republicans and Democrats. Nevertheless, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) nd lack of partisan e¤ect in policy outcomes
at local level in the US; Furthermore, policy divergence could not be caused exclusively by politicianspreferences
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to rationalize the presence of ideological positions, recent contributions have microfounded the
existence of citizenseconomic beliefs which create heterogeneous preferences over economic pol-
icy.4This heterogeneity has not been considered in the theoretical analysis of the political choice
of allocation and redistribution policy. This paper overcomes this limitation introducing partisan
politicians and voters who exhibit heterogeneous preferences on the extent of government provision
of goods. In contrast to previous results in the literature, the identity of political parties matters
and the composition of government spending depends on the ideology of the party that wins the
election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the electoral competition
model on which the analysis relies. Section III characterizes political equilibrium and discusses
the main results about the e¤ect of partisan politics on the scope of government, income taxation
schedules and competition between political parties. Section IV characterizes the set of constrained
Pareto e¢ cient allocations and compare it with the equilibrium allocations that result from electoral
competition. The nal section concludes and briey discusses further research.
2 A Model of Partisan Electoral Competition
2.1 Economic Environment and Political Structure
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of citizens with measure one. Citizens belong
to a nite number of groups with measure j , j 2 f1; :::; Jg, and none of them constitutes a
majority of the population. Each individual i in group j is endowed with yj units of a private
good. This endowment can be thought as the level of gross income obtained by individuals of a
given occupation (or economic group) in a market economy. In this economy, the aggregate income
is xed and given by y =
PJ
j=1 
jyj , and the initial distribution of income across groups can be
modied by government intervention. In particular, through a voting process citizens choose a
government that implements allocation and redistribution policies.
Consider that there are two political parties, left (L) and right (R), competing for o¢ ce in an
election. Suppose that voting is costless, nobody abstains and winning the election corresponds to
obtaining the support of the majority of the population. Politicians can raise income taxes to fund
both the public provision of goods and group-specic cash transfers. There are no constraints on
over policy outcomes. As an example, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) point out that politicians might choose
strategically policy divergence in order to mobilize core voters and raise their chances of winning elections.
4The literature mainly focuses on examining how beliefs over the fairness of social competition a¤ect individuals
preferences for income redistribution policy. For instance, theoretical contributions by Piketty (1995), Alesina and
Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006); and empirical work by Fong (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004)
and Alesina and LaFerrara (2005). Bénabou (2008) develops a model in which ideology emerges as the result of
collectively sustained distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of the public sector providing goods and
services; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) points out that indoctrination can be a relevant source to explain the
formation of economic beliefs over the role of government in the economy. In particular, they show how communist
dictatorship in East Germany leads to stronger preferences for government intervention and redistribution.
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the taxation schedule that government can implement, and for simplicity suppose that economic
policies do not create distortions and deadweight losses. The government has available a linear
technology that produces one unit of public good, g, with one unit of private good. Then, political
parties can make promises over the amount of resources that they would devote to the production
of those goods, gP for P 2 fL;Rg.5 On the other side, let cjP be the net income that results
from taxation policy promised by party P to group j. Thus, the vector cP  fcjP gJj=1 denotes
the distribution of net income among groups promised by party P . Before the election, each party
credibly commits to redistribution and allocation policy platforms xP = (gP ; cP ) to be implemented
if P wins the election. These policy platforms must satisfy economic feasibility:
gP +
JX
j=1
jcjP = y (1)
The set of constraints is completed by the non-negativity constraints gP  0 and cjP  0 for each
group. These constraints dene a budget set of private and public spending allocations which are
feasible. The set of available and attainable scal policies that satises all restrictions, X  RJ+1;
is non-empty, convex and compact.
2.2 CitizensPreferences
Citizens care about the e¤ect of income tax-transfers schedules on their own economic well-being.
Suppose that individuals have the same preferences over available net income, c, represented by the
utility function u(c). This function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0,
where subscript denotes partial derivative with respect to the identied argument) and strictly
concave (ucc < 0) in c. Marginal utility is bounded away from 0 and uc(0) =1.
Citizens hold heterogeneous views over the role of government providing goods and services.
In particular, each individual has a desired level of public goods provision, g. The larger the
ideological bliss point is, the stronger the belief in government intervention. It is common to
assume that ideological preferences over social outcomes are well-represented by satiable Euclidean
preferences W (g; gi ). The function W () is twice di¤erentiable, continuous and strictly concave in
the distance, zi, between implemented and ideologically desired public goods policy for individual
i, i.e. zi = jg   gi j.6 For analytical simplicity, consider that individualspartisan valuation over
public provision of goods is represented by quadratic utility, W (g; gi ) =  (g   gi )2.
Parties do not know the idiosyncratic ideological position of each citizen, gi  0. However,
5By public goods, we refer to goods provided by the government which are not targeted to specic groups but to
the whole population.
6The specication of satiable preferences allows to captures the presence of ideological citizens that, for instance,
are against large expenditures to fund the public provision of goods. As an example, this specication captures
the fact that, above a certain level of public provision, larger expenditures decrease the well-being of pro-market
citizens. Instead, in standard models with non-satiable preferences, larger public provision of goods always implies
larger well-being for all citizens.
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ideological beliefs are persistent over time and, therefore, we can assume that the distribution of
partisan preferences in each group is common knowledge. Suppose that the idiosyncratic ideological
parameter of individuals who belong to group j are drawn from a uniform distribution, F j(g),
over the range [gja ; gjb ]. Groups can di¤er with respect to both their average ideological positions,
gj = (gja + gjb )=2, and the ideological heterogeneity within the group, which is measured by the
density of the distribution, j = 1=(gjb   gja ). Assume that j is small enough, and therefore the
distribution of ideological preferences is su¢ ciently dispersed within each group. Groups with a
broader support of ideological parameters (i.e. greater ideological dispersion) exhibit lower density.
Denote  =
PJ
j=1 
jj the weighted average of the ideological heterogeneity across groups.
Given the assumption on uniform distribution of ideologies within groups, let gm  (
PJ
j=1 
jjgj)=
be the weighted average of the mean ideology in each group weighted by the size and ideological
heterogeneity of the group. This weighted average measures the median ideological type in the
overall population, and this ideological type di¤ers from the mean ideological position as long as
the level of ideological heterogeneity varies across groups.
Given the policy platform xP = (gP ; cP ) proposed by P 2 fL;Rg, the indirect utility function
of citizen i who belongs to group j and exhibits ideological type gi is given by:
Vi(c
j
P ; gP ; g

i ) = u(c
j
P ) +W (gP ; g

i ) (2)
This function is strictly continuous, twice di¤erentiable and strictly concave in cj and g, and it
captures both self-interested and ideological motivations of citizens.
In addition to economic policies, citizens also care about the personal qualities of politicians
ruling the polity. Suppose that once parties announce policy platforms, along the electoral cam-
paign, political parties receive random popularity shocks, "L and "R, common to all citizens. The
relative popularity shock, " = "L   "R; measures the perception that voters have on party L with
respect to R at the time of the election (i.e. average relative popularity of party L). We assume
that the common shock " is uniformly distributed, and independently from gi ; with density  and
expected value, E("), equal to 0. The density parameter  is a measure of aggregate dispersion in
the perception of the shock, and hence of aggregate uncertainty about the election outcome. In-
deed, a lower value of  means more uncertainty about the distribution of the popularity shock. We
assume that  is small enough, and therefore there is su¢ cient uncertainty regarding the electoral
outcome.7
2.3 Partisan Politicians
Political parties hold heterogeneous positions on the extent of government provision of goods.
Specically, suppose that each party has a desired level of public provision of goods denoted by
7Next section and Mathematical Appendix A discuss with more detail the precise boundary conditions on the
value of  .
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gP  0, which yields a strictly higher utility than all other policies. Parties consider that the
residual aggregate income of the economy has to be in hands of citizens, but we assume that
parties do not have partisan preferences about how income has to be distributed across groups. For
simplicity we also assume that partiespreferences over public goods are represented by satiable
quadratic utility,WP (g; gP ) =  (g gP )2 for P 2 fL;Rg. This utility function is strictly continuos,
di¤erentiable and strictly concave in g.
We further suppose that party L; pro-government party, is the one with the highest preference for
public intervention, and party R, pro-market party, believes in a lower involvement of government
in the economy, gL > g

R > 0. In each group there are citizens whose ideological views correspond to
partiespositions (i.e. gP 2 [gja ; gjb ] 8j and 8P ), and groups can be biased toward either rightist or
leftist ideological positions. Nevertheless, to preserve symmetry, we suppose that partiesideological
leanings are symmetrically located around the median ideological type (i.e. gm = (gR+g

L)=2). This
assumption implies that there is no overall population bias toward any party ideological position,
so neither party L nor R has an exante advantage in the election.
In spite of partisan views over policy, politicians can credibly commit to a policy platform xP =
(gP ; cP ) that departs from their ideological positions.8 Besides partisan preferences, politicians can
assign non-material private benets associated to power. Denote by Q the ego-rents or value that
both parties attach to winning elections (which for simplicity we assume independent of ideological
positions). This parameter measures the degree of politicians o¢ ce-holding motivation and is
assumed to be weakly positive if P comes to power and 0 otherwise. Given the presence of electoral
uncertainty, the expected utility of party R is dened as:
EUR(xR; xL) = P (xR; xL)[Q+WR(gR; g

R)] + [1  P (xR; xL)]WR(gL; gR) (3)
where the probability that party R comes to o¢ ce, P (xR; xL), captures the uncertainty regarding
electoral outcome and summarizes expected voting behavior of citizens. The expected utility for
party L is symmetric with probability of winning equal to 1  P (xR; xL).
3 Political Equilibrium
3.1 Stages of the Political Game
The timing of the political game is as follows: i) political parties simultaneously and non-cooperatively
credibly announce their economic policy platforms, xR = (gR; cR) and xL = (gL; cL); ii) the random
common popularity shock, ", is realized; iii) citizens vote for the party that they prefer, fR;Lg;
and nally, iv) whichever party P that obtains the majority of the votes, wins the election and
8Alesina (1988) points out the credibility problem of partisan politicians in one-shot static games. To avoid
candidates commitment problem, we assume that this model represents the reduced form of a dynamic game in
which political parties run in repeated elections. Parties would be punished by losing credibility if politicians do not
deliver the announced policy.
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implements the economic policy promised at the beginning of the game. Hence, the political game
presented above has two stages: policy announcements and voting. We now seek to characterize
the political equilibrium of the game working backwards.
3.1.1 Voting
Citizens vote for the party that they prefer given economic policy announcements and the relative
popularity of political parties. [At the voting stage, policy platforms (xR; xL) and common bias
" are observed by voters]. Suppose that an individual with ideological preference gi who belongs
to group j is promised public goods provision and income tax-transfers schedules (gR; c
j
R) by pro-
market party and (gL; c
j
L) by pro-government party. Given individualspreferences over economic
policies (2) and the realization of the random shock, citizen i in group j votes for party R over L
conditional on policy platforms if:
Vi(c
j
R; gR; g

i ) > Vi(c
j
L; gL; g

i ) + " (4)
while voting for party L if this inequality is reversed. Given policy platforms, in each group can
be citizens with an idiosyncratic ideological parameter, gjs , such that they are indi¤erent between
voting for the pro-market, R, as for the pro-government, L, party. The swing voter type in group
j is implicitly dened by:
u(cjR) +W (gR; g
j
s ) = u(c
j
L) +W (gL; g
j
s ) + " (5)
[Voters who belong to group j with an ideological type gi below (above) the cut-o¤ ideological
type, gjs , vote for pro-market party (pro-government party)]. Suppose that voters who are indif-
ferent between political parties randomize equally over the set of parties. The swing voter type in
group j when citizenspreferences over public goods are represented by quadratic utility is given
by:
gjs = gLR +
1
2g
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)  "] (6)
where gLR is the average of partiespromises regarding public provision of goods and g is the
di¤erence between leftist and rightist proposals.9Given that partisan preferences over public goods
are uniformly distributed in each group, the overall vote share [fraction of votes received by party
R] for party R [when policy platforms are xR and xL] is given by:
SR  SR(xR; xL; ") = 1
2
+
JX
j=1
jj [gjs   gj ] (7)
The complement share of citizens, 1 
JP
j=1
jF j(gjs ), votes for pro-government party L; SL.
9See Mathematical Appendix A for full development and discussion of swing voter types, vote shares and proba-
bility of winning.
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3.1.2 Policy Announcements
Rolling back to the rst stage of the game, when politicians commit to policy platforms, the
common valuation shock has not been realized. The swing voter type in each group depends on
both policy platforms and the realized value of the shock, gjs = gjs (xR; xL; "). Hence, parties
are uncertain about who are the swing voters in each group and voting is a random variable for
politicians. Given that the expected value of the shock is equal to zero, the expected swing voters
in group j are citizens indi¤erent between parties economic policy proposals. Political parties
therefore choose their platforms keeping in mind that the expected voting decisions in each group
are given by the expected cut-point ideological type, E[gjs ] = bgjs . Let bgs  (PJj=1 jjbgjs )= be
the expected swing voters ideological type in the overall population. This type is the weighted
average ideological type of the expected swing voters in each social group, where weights depend
on the concentration of voters located at the cut-points.10
We assume majority voting, so that winning the election corresponds to obtaining more than
fty per cent of the total vote. Given the expected swing voter type in each group and distributional
assumptions on ideological types and popularity shock, the probability that pro-market party R
wins the election can be expressed as:
P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+  2g[bgs   gm] (8)
Pro-government party L anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability 1 
P (xR; xL). Probabilistic voting provides continuity of the probability function in a multidimensional
policy space. Strict continuity of both individualsindirect utility functions and the distribution of
ideological preferences in each group, and the aggregate uncertainty created by the random shock
yield a smooth mapping from policy platforms to expected vote shares. This smoothness insures
that the probability of winning for each party P is strictly continuous in both policy platforms. On
the other side, probability of winning is the sum of striclty concave functions of policy pla¤orms,
multiplied by striclty positive parameters. Thus, the probability function for each party P is strictly
concave in partys own platform, xP , and strictly convex in its opponents proposal, x P .11
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party chooses a combina-
tion of public good provision and net income for each group, xP = (gP ; cP ) for P 2 fR;Lg, that
maximizes its expected utility subject to economic feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Par-
ties take into account the uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome by the probability function
(8) which summarizes expected voting behavior of citizens given announced policies. Thus, the
10This denition follows from Dixit and Londregan (1998) discussion on the economic ideology of swing voters.
11See Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) for a detailed technical discussion on continuity
and quasiconcavity properties of probability of winning functions in probabilistic voting models.
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policy choice problem of the right-wing party R is given by:
max
gR;fcjRgJj=1
EUR(xR; xL) s.t. gR +
JX
j=1
jcjR = y and gR  0 ; cjR  0 8j (9)
The pro-government party L makes simultaneous policy announcements and its policy choice
problem is symmetric to the one of party R. [details appendix]
3.2 Equilibrium Policies
Proposition 1 (Existence) A Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies exists, and it is unique.
Proof. [1] For each citizen, parties policy proposals, idiosyncratic ideological preferences and
popularity shock yield di¤erent utility levels under the government of either party R or L. Then,
every citizen votes for the party which provides her the maximum level of utility. When the utility
level implied by each party is the same, indi¤erent individuals randomize equally over the set of
political parties and vote for one of the parties.
[2] Given that for each political party i) the feasible set of strategies dened by the governments
budget constraint is non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) partiesexpected utility functions are
1) strictly continuous in both policy platforms, xR and xL; and 2) strictly concave in its own plat-
form, xP , and strictly convex in the platform of its opponent, x P , for P 2 fR;Lg, because of the
continuity and concavity properties of both probability functions and partiespartisan preferences.
Then, given [1],according to Glicksbergs Fixed Point Theorem, there does exists a unique Nash
Equilibrium in pure strategies, and it is unique.
The system of equations made up of the best responses for each political party and their budget
constraints simultaneously determine the Nash Equilibrium in the rst stage of the game. Therefore,
equilibrium partiesproposals of public goods and net income taxation, (gNP ; c
N
P ) for P 2 fR;Lg,
satisfy the following system of equations:
@P (xNR ;x
N
L )
@gR

NR
R
+
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@WR(g
N
R ;g

R)
@gR
R
= 1 (10)
@P (xNR ;x
N
L )
@cjR

NR
R
= j 8 j (11)
 @P (xNR ;xNL )@gL 
NL
L
+
[1  P (xNR ; xNL )]@WL(g
N
L ;g

L)
@gL
L
= 1 (12)
 @P (xNR ;xNL )
@cjL

NL
L
= j 8 j (13)
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where 
NP for P 2 fR;Lg denotes party Ps benet of winning elections. This benet is dened as
the di¤erence between partys payo¤s under victory and under defeat;12and where P > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to party Ps budget constraint, which measures the value of one
extra unit of income for partisan politicians.13
This system of equations shows that, in equilibrium, parties equalize the marginal cost of
providing public goods to the marginal benet in their expected utility expressed in terms of
income (i.e. normalized by the Lagrange multiplier, P ). Furthermore, for each group, parties
equalize the marginal cost of increasing one unit of net income in a group of size j to the marginal
contribution to their expected utility, expressed also in terms of income.
The system of best responses reveals that both parties o¤ering the same economic policy cannot
be an equilibrium. Politicians are trading o¤ the desirability of the policy from their partisan
views against the probability that their policy proposal wins the election. In the presence of
electoral uncertainty, the electoral competition between partisan politicians, who can commit to
policy platforms, determines divergent equilibrium policy platforms.
Proposition 2 (Policy Divergence) In equilibrium, partisan parties announce divergent eco-
nomic policy platforms, xNR 6= xNL . In particular, pro-government partys proposal of public good
provision is larger than the pro-market partys policy platform, gNL > g
N
R .
If parties uniquely considered the electoral returns of policy platforms and converge, there would
not be incentives to modify platforms to increase their chances of winning elections. Nevertheless,
both parties still would have incentives to adjust public goods policies toward their ideological posi-
tions because departing from them is costly. Therefore, full convergence cannot be an equilibrium.
If parties chose their most preferred policies, there would not be incentives to adapt platforms
to partiesideological bliss points. However, politicians would have incentives to adjust policies to
increase their electoral returns because they care about the electoral outcome. Indeed, politicians
compete for o¢ ce aiming to avoid the victory of their opponents who would implement distasteful
ideological views. The potential presence of private benets associated to victory would increase
the relevance of electoral incentives.
In equilibrium, there is partial economic policy divergence, in which each party balances its
policy preferences with its chances of ruling the polity. These insights on partisan electoral compe-
tition with commitment are well-known and rely on classical contributions due to Wittman (1977,
12The benets of winning are divided into two components. The rst component captures politicians weakly
positive private payo¤s associated to win elections. The second component measures the ideological benets associated
to victory. Hence, party Ps benets of winning elections are given by:

NP = 
P (x
N
R ; x
N
L ) = Q+WP (g
N
P ; g

P ) WP (gN P ; gP )
In equilibrium, this magnitude is weakly positive to prevent the situation where party P prefers to lose.
13See Mathematical Appendix B for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the political equilibrium
and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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1983) and Calvert (1985). This theoretical framework has not been considered to investigate how
partisan preferences a¤ect the simultaneous political choice of public goods provision and income
redistribution.
In equilibrium, the provision of public goods and income taxation schedules proposed by partisan
politicians satisfy economic feasibility and the following system of best responses:
  2(gNR   gm)
NR   2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL ) =
1
k
k

k uc(c
kN
R )

N
R 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg (14)
  2(gNL   gm)
NL   2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )] =
1
k
k

k uc(c
kN
L )

N
L 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg (15)
This system of equations can be written as follows:14
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
gR;cR
+ NR
JX
j=1
jMRS
jgR
gR;cR =MRTg;c (16)
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
gL;cL
+ NL
JX
j=1
jMRS
jgL
gL;cL =MRTg;c (17)
where MRSjg

m
gP ;cP is the marginal rate of substitution between public goods and net income for
individuals in group j with median ideological type given policy platform by party P 2 fR;Lg;
MRS
jgP
gP ;cP is the rate at which individuals in group j who hold ideological positions of party
P 2 fR;Lg are willing to trade public goods for net income; and MRTg;c is the rate at which the
government is able to transform income into public goods. Furthermore, in equilibrium, NR and
NL are given by:
NR =
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
 
NR
and NL =
[1  P (xNR ; xNL )]
 
NL
(18)
These equations capture how electoral incentives and ideological positions simultaneously de-
termine the equilibrium choice of public goods proposals by political parties. When one party
announces public goods provision closer to its ideological leanings, it reduces its expected number
of votes. That raises its chances of losing in front of politicians who would provide public goods
more distant from its partisan preferences. It is important to notice that even pure ideological
politicians (i.e. Q = 0) do not announce public goods platforms that perfectly reect their partisan
preferences. Politicians have concave utility over the distance between proposed and ideologically
desired public goods policy and therefore they exhibit ideological risk aversion. The marginal
increase in utility from a undesired level of provision is larger than the marginal gain in utility
because public goods provision is closer to their partisan positions. Ideological risk aversion limits
partiesincentives to diverge. In particular, risk aversion leads pro-market (pro-government) party
14See Mathematical Appendix B.4. for a complete description of how this system of equations is obtained.
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to propose public goods provision larger (lower) than its ideological bliss point. Thus, electoral
competition generates an ideological sacrice in platforms proposed by party P , zP . This ideolog-
ical sacrice is dened as the di¤erence between proposed and ideologically desired public goods
policy by party P , zP = jgNP   gP j 8P 2 fR;Lg.
Each party could increase its electoral returns by adjusting public goods to the weighted average
of the preferred policies by individuals with median ideological types. This adjustment would
raise its chances of winning elections and implementing its policy platforms. However, parties
hold ideological positions regarding public goods provision and it would be costly to depart from
these positions. In case of victory politicians should implement a less preferred policy. Besides,
electoral incentives to adjust policies are decreasing because of concavity of the probability function.
Therefore, parties do not have incentives to promise the same level of public goods.
The extent of policy divergence between parties policy proposals depends on i) the degree
of aggregate uncertainty regarding the electoral outcome; ii) the polarization between parties
ideological leanings; and iii) the presence of politiciansprivate benets associated to win elections.15
3.3 Distributive Politics
As far as income taxation policies are concerned, the electoral competition between partisan politi-
cians leads to income taxation schedules that satisfy:
kuc(c
kN
P ) = 
k0uc(c
k0N
P ) 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg (19)
The electoral incentives for political income redistribution are consistent with the well-known
insights on distributive politics highlighted by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Lon-
dregan (1996). In equilibrium, both parties redistribute resources towards groups with lower gross
income because of the concavity of utility over consumption. Political parties also favor groups
with larger concentration of pivotal voters who could swing their vote. In the proposed model, the
concentration of expected swing voters is measured by the densitiy of the uniform distribution of
economic ideological preferences within each group, j .16
While in Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) individuals exhibit
partisan biases or attachments to ideological xed positions that are not related to economic policy
and could be interpreted as positions on value issues (e.g. religious and moral positions), where
politicians who compete for o¢ ce should favor groups with more non-biased voters, this paper
builds a stochastic preference probabilistic voting model in which voters and politicians hold ideo-
logical positions over economic policy. In this case, redistributive policies favors groups with larger
15The e¤ect of these factors on policy divergence is discussed with detail in the comparative statics section.
16Given that the marginal utility of consumption at 0 net income is equal to innite, uc(0) = 1, then corner
solutions are not possible and the equilibrium is always interior.
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concentration of individuals whose economic ideological positions made them indi¤erent between
policy proposals.
The factors that characterize income taxation schedules are identical for both parties and there-
fore both parties favor the same groups of voters targeting either larger transfers or lower taxes.
However, politicians commit to di¤erent levels of public goods provision and therefore they promise
di¤erent net income in absolute terms. The larger the provision of public goods is, the lower the
magnitude of net income targeted to individuals.
Proposition 3 (Income Tax-Transfers Schedules) The pro-market party o¤ers larger net in-
come than the pro-government party to all groups of the polity, cjNR > c
jN
L 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg.
The public provision of goods is funded through non-linear income taxation schedules. Given
the assumption on concavity of utility over income, politicians fund public goods reducing in larger
proportion the net income of groups targeted with more resources (i.e. public goods are funded
through progressive income taxation). Therefore, given that the left-wing party commits to higher
provision of goods, the pro-government party announces income taxation schedules that implement
lower income inequality than the proposed by pro-market party.
Corollary 4 (Partisan Income Inequality) The pro-government party implements lower in-
come inequality than the pro-market party.
It is relevant to notice that although politicians do not exhibit partisan preferences over the
distribution of income, ideological preferences over public goods provision lead parties to o¤er
di¤erent levels of income inequality. Redistributive politics is a¤ected by the presence of partisan
politicians even when parties do not hold ideological positions over the distribution of income.17
Each party commits to its largest public good platform in the particular case in which all groups
exhibit the same concentration of expected swing voters, j =  8j. In this case, according to
(19), the marginal utility of private consumption is equalized across groups of voters. The expected
marginal electoral returns of targeting net income are identical across groups and politicians do not
have incentives to discriminate them in terms of net income. In equilibrium, both political parties
commit to income taxation schedules that implement an egalitarian distribution of income. The
equilibrium policy platforms satisfy the following system of equations:
MRSg

m
gR;cR
+ NRMRS
gR
gR;cR =MRTg;c (20)
MRSg

m
gL;cL
+ NLMRS
gL
gL;cL =MRTg;c (21)
17Dixit and Londregan (1998) consider a distributive politics game in which citizens and parties exhibit ideological
concerns about the distribution of income and the extent of inequality. However, this important contribution abstracts
away the possibility of partisan preferences over the public provision of goods.
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3.4 Advantage of Pro-Market ideological positions
In equilibrium, the expected swing voter type in group j, bgjNs , is implicitly dened by:
u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) =W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (22)
As the analysis above has shown, the net income promised to any group j by the right-wing
party is larger than the income that results from taxation schedules committed by the left-wing
party, cjNR > c
jN
L 8j. This means that, in equilibrium, expected swing votersprivate well-being
is larger under right-wing partys income taxation platform, i.e. u(cjNR ) > u(c
jN
L ). Besides, the
pro-government party promises larger provision of public goods than the pro-market party, gNL >
gNR . Given these equilibrium policy platforms, according to (22), the ideological utility loss of
expected swing voters under the left-wing proposal is lower than the ideological loss implied by the
right-wing platform, i.e. W (gNL ; bgjNs ) > W (gNR ; bgjNs ). This shows that equilibrium swing voters
are indi¤erent between the ideological benets associated to left-wing partys victory (i.e. lower
ideological sacrice) and the larger private economic well-being obtained if the right-wing party
wins the election. Therefore, in equilibrium, the ideological positions of expected swing voters in
each group are closer to pro-government than to pro-market ideological positions.
Proposition 5 (Ideology Swing Voters) In equilibrium, the expected pivotal voters are moder-
ate pro-leftist citizens.
The ideological type of the equilibrium indi¤erent voter in each group is larger than the median
ideological position in the overall population, bgjNs > gm. This result suggests that in equilibrium
political parties commit to policies such that in each group there exists a subset of citizens biased
towards pro-government ideological positions who end up preferring the overall economic policy
platforms by the right-wing party. A subset of centrist and moderate pro-leftist citizens are expected
to vote for the pro-market party. Hence, in equilibrium the probability that the left-wing party
wins elections is lower than the chances for the right-wing party, P (xNR ; x
N
L ) > 1=2.
Corollary 6 (Electoral Advantage right-wing party) In equilibrium, the probability that pro-
market politicians win the election is higher than the chances for pro-government politicians.
Citizens hold ideological positions but also care about their own economic well-being and sup-
port taxation policies that redistribute income towards them. In fact, voters are willing to trade
ideological positions over the public provision of goods by promises of larger net income. This pro-
vides an advantage to the pro-market party which can court centrist and moderate pro-leftist voters
in every group targeting them with larger net income and reducing the public provision of goods.
This strategic targeting of net income allows right-wing politicians to increase their expected elec-
toral returns and, at the same time, propose public good provision closer to its partisan positions.
The expected strategy of the right-wing party forces ideological risk-averse pro-government party
to decrease its promises of public goods. The left-wing party increases the targeted amount of net
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income to groups with larger concentration of pivotal voters in order to increase their expected
number of votes. As a result, in equilibrium, public good platform by the left-wing party supports
a larger ideological sacrice than the proposal by the right-wing party, zNL > z
N
R .
Corollary 7 (Ideological Sacrice left-wing party) In equilibrium, the pro-government pub-
lic goods proposal supports a larger ideological sacrice than the proposal of the pro-market party.
I have underlined that each political party promises its largest public goods platform when all
groups exhibit the same concentration of pivotal voters. In this particular case, both the electoral
advantage of the right-wing party and the ideological sacrice of the left-wing party are minimized.
However, when the concentration of expected swing voters di¤ers across groups, politicians have
incentives to discriminate them through di¤erential net income. The di¤erentiation across groups
is possible because of the availability of non-linear income taxation schedules. In this case, there
exists more competition to attract pivotal moderate pro-leftist voters who could swing their vote.
This competition leads both parties to reduce resources to fund public goods provision and to
increase the net income targeted to groups.
3.5 Discussion of the main result
Lizzeri and Persico (2001) rst pointed out that, under certain conditions, in a distributive politics
game with public goods, targetability of cash transfers can yield a premium over public goods.
In particular, electoral incentives lead o¢ ce-motivated politicians to reduce the provision of public
goods, because of their lack of targetability, and to increase the amount of resources devoted to cash
transfers. This paper shows that these incentives also exist in partisan electoral competition and
under less restrictive conditions. The main novelty relies on pointing out that now targetability
provides an advantage for particular partisan politicians. Indeed, the possibility of di¤erential
targeting of net income, given the availability of non-linear taxation schedules, allows the right-
party to attract larger expected number of voters. Group-specic income targeting increases the
electoral advantage of right-wing party and raises the ideological sacrice of the left-wing party.
One of the main insights of this paper relies on presenting a new source of electoral advantage
that depends on politicianspartisan preferences over economic policy. Several signicant contribu-
tions have examined electoral advantages generated by exogenous non-economic policy positions.
For instance, Roemer (1998) discusses how the presence of value issues such as religion might con-
fer an advantage to right-wing parties and limit the extent of income redistribution; Groseclose
(2001) analyzes partisan competition when one party exhibits a valence advantage over the other
competing party (e.g. incumbency advantage); Besley and Preston (2007) and Besley et al. (2010)
investigates the policy implications of electoral advantage in districts with a larger presence of core
voters attached to one party ideological positions unrelated to economic platforms. In order to
create electoral advantages, these contributions consider that voter choices depend on issues not
related to economic policy. In contrast to the previous literature, this paper examines the case in
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which politicians expect that voters make their electoral choices based uniquely on the e¤ect of
policy proposals on their economic well-being. [*] In this case, the electoral advantage depends
on chosen economic policy platforms and therefore it is an endogenous variable in the electoral
competition game.
The model presented in this paper can be viewed as the reduced form of a two-party competi-
tion in a majoritarian electoral system. Iversen and Soskice (2006) underline that countries with
majoritarian electoral system are dominated by right-wing parties which undertake less redistribu-
tion of income. This paper suggests a new explanation for this evidence. In majoritarian systems,
when parties hold partisan positions over the public provision of goods, pro-government ideological
positions can be more costly to pursue in terms of electoral feasibility. The public funding of goods
through non-linear income taxation schedules provides an electoral advantage to pro-market ide-
ological positions. Right-wing parties exhibit larger chances of winning elections and their policy
proposals yield to larger income inequality.
One related contribution is Huber and Ting (2009) who also depart from non-economic consid-
erations to examine the presence of an advantage for right-wing parties in majoritarian electoral
systems. Their analysis considers two types of transfers: means tested income redistribution from
the rich to the poor; and geographically-targeted transfers to specic districts. They show how
the right-wing party may create an electoral advantage when focuses more on targeted rather than
redistributive transfers. Instead, the explanation proposed in this paper does not constrain income
redistribution schedules: tax-transfers schedules can be specic to groups of voters distinguished
by income-levels, geographic location or any other characteristic. The analysis therefore suggests
a di¤erent explanation for why right-wing parties have an advantage in majoritarian systems, one
that is grounded in the presence of partisan preferences over the public provision of goods.
4 Comparative Statics
Equilibrium policy platforms proposed by political parties diverge because of both uncertainty
about electoral outcome and politicianspartisan preferences on the economic role of government.
Hence, it is worthwhile to examine how the presence of private benets associated to o¢ ce-holding
and the degree of uncertainty a¤ect equilibrium policies and the competition between parties.
4.1 Electoral uncertainty
In the proposed model, citizensvoting decisions do not uniquely depend on economic policy plat-
forms. In fact, citizens also consider the valence of politicians running for o¢ ce.18This valuation is
unknown by politicians when they choose policy platforms and therefore it generates uncertainty
18This valence could be interpreted as the charisma or popularity of politicians who compete for o¢ ce. In some
particular elections and systems of government (e.g. presidential systems), citizensvoting decisions might be highly
determined by personal characteristics of politicians.
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about the electoral outcome. This uncertainty has been introduced through a common shock re-
ceived by political parties along the electoral campaign. In particular, the relative valuation of
politicians is drawn from a uniform distribution with density  . Thus, the parameter  can be
interpreted as a measure of the relative weight between policy platforms and politiciansvalence
on individualsvoting decisions.
When the valence of politicians has a large impact on voting decisions (i.e. low parameter  ),
the electoral uncertainty faced by parties when choosing policy platforms is high. For instance,
consider the limit case in which  ! 0 (i.e. huge electoral uncertainty). In this situation, party
Rs equilibrium condition (14) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL )! 0 (23)
Similarly, given (15), party Ls equilibrium condition is given by:
 2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )]! 0 (24)
Given that the expected valence is equal to zero, when  ! 0 the equilibrium probability that
party R wins elections tends to one-half. Therefore, by (23) and (24), when politicians face huge
electoral uncertainty equilibrium public goods proposals tend to converge to parties ideological
bliss points:
gNR ! gR and gNL ! gL (25)
Public good policy divergence rises with uncertainty. The larger the electoral uncertainty is,
the closer public goods proposals to partiesideological positions. The extent of policy divergence
depends on partiesideological polarization (i.e. gL   gR > 0). Furthermore, as uncertainty rises,
the electoral advantage of ideological market positions decreases. Indeed, both parties tend to
exhibit the same chances of winning elections.
At the opposite extreme, citizens could vote mainly on economic policy proposals rather than
politiciansvalence (i.e. high parameter  ). In that case, the electoral uncertainty faced by politi-
cians when choosing policy platforms would be low. When  ! 1, equilibrium conditions (16)
and (17) can be written as:
JX
j=1
j
 2(gNP   gm)
uc(c
jN
P )
! 1 then
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
g;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (26)
Hence, in equilibrium, both parties tend to converge to identical economic policy platforms
(i.e. gN = gNR = g
N
L and c
j N = cjNR = c
jN
L 8j) and the ideological sacrice is lower for the
right. The equilibrium public goods provision and income taxation schedules tend to converge
towards the weighted average of the preferred policy of individuals located in group j with median
ideological type. Both political parties tend to implement the same income inequality through
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taxation schedules characterized by (19). When policy platforms tend to converge, individuals are
expected to be indi¤erent between political parties and thus the equilibrium partiesprobabilities
of winning elections tend to one-half (i.e. the electoral advantage of the right tends to zero).
In the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of pivotal voters (j =
 8j), both political parties announce income taxation schedules that implement an egalitarian
distribution of income (cj N = cN 8j). In this situation, when electoral uncertainty is reduced,
partiesequilibrium policy platforms satisfy:
 2(gNP   gm)
uc(cN )
! 1 then MRSgmg;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (27)
Hence, political parties tend to converge towards the preferred public good policy by the median
ideological type in the overall population.
These insights point out that when uncertainty decreases, policy platforms tend to converge and
policy platforms determine a larger ideological sacrice for the left. While convergence is monoton-
ically less likely as uncertainty increases, the novel result of the model, the electoral advantage of
the right, is non monotonic in  . Indeed, the electoral advantage goes to zero when uncertainty
goes to both extremes.
The presence of strong forces toward policy convergence in models of partisan electoral com-
petition was rst raised by Calvert (1985). In fact, ideological risk aversion leads parties towards
policy convergence. The presence of uncertainty about the identity of swing voters is a necessary
condition to prevent that risk-averse politicians implement identical policy platforms. However,the
two novel insights provided by our model about the non monotonic electoral advantage and the
di¤erent ideological sacrices could not be obtained in that standard setting.
4.2 Private Benets of winning elections
As the analysis above suggests, even pure ideological parties (i.e. Q = 0) consider the e¤ect of policy
platforms on their chances of winning elections. Policy motivated politicians sacrice ideological
positions in order to prevent the victory of their opponentspartisan preferences. The potential
presence of private benets associated to win elections would increase the relevance of electoral
incentives even more. Indeed, o¢ ce-motivated politicians are willing to sacrice ideology in order
to raise their expected number of votes. In the limit case in which o¢ ce-holding is the only thing
that matter (Q ! 1), politicians choose policy platforms to maximize their expected electoral
returns. In equilibrium, public goods provision and income taxation schedules tend to converge
and satisfy (26). Politicians adjust policy platforms to the weighted average of the preferred policy
of individuals with median ideological positions in each social group.
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5 Normative Analysis: Utilitarian Allocation
This section undertakes welfare analysis, investigating the allocation of resources that would be
implemented by a benevolent government. Consider the utilitarian social welfare function (UW )
which aggregates all individualsutilities given them the same weight. UW is:
JX
j=1
ju(cj) +
JX
j=1
j
Z gjb
gja
W (g; gi )
jdgi (28)
A benevolent utilitarian government maximizes this social welfare function subject to the avail-
able resources given by the economy feasibility constraint.19The allocation of net income across
groups satises:
uc(c
k
U ) = uc(c
k0
U ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (29)
A benevolent government implements income taxation schedules that lead to an egalitarian
distribution of income, cjU = cU 8j. This result follows from the assumptions on homogeneous pref-
erences over net income represented by concave utility functions, and the absence of distortions and
income losses generated by income redistribution. The utilitarian allocation of resources satises:
Wg(gU ; g
)
uc(cU )
= 1!MRSgg;c =MRTg;c (30)
Therefore, a benevolent utilitarian government maximizes welfare when it provides the level of
public goods preferred by individuals with average ideological type subject to economic feasibility.
Does electoral competition implement the utilitarian allocation?
On the one hand, only in the particular case in which groups exhibit the same concentration of
expected swing voters, politicians do not have electoral incentives to discriminate across groups and
political parties implement an egalitarian distribution of income. On the other hand, politicians
provision of public goods tends to converge when either i) the uncertainty about the electoral
outcome is low; or ii) the private benets associated to win elections are large (i.e. reduced weight
of partisan preferences).
Hence, political parties choose income redistribution schedules and public goods provision that
implement the utilitarian allocation if and only if: i) groups exhibit the same concentration of
expected swing voters; and ii) politicians only consider electoral incentives because of either large
private benets associated to win elections or the absence of electoral uncertainty.
It is important to notice that when only the rst condition holds (i.e. egalitarian distribution
of income), politicianspartisan preferences prevent to reach the utilitarian allocation. In this case,
pro-market (pro-government) party underprovides (overprovides) public goods with respect to the
utilitarian level of provision (i.e. gNR < gU < g
N
L ).
19See Mathematical Appendix D for details regarding the characterization of the utilitarian allocation.
21
6 Conclusions
This paper has rst investigated the e¤ect of heterogeneous partisan preferences over the public
provision of goods on the scope of government spending and the political redistribution of income.
The presence of both ideological politicians and uncertainty about the electoral outcome generates
a partisanship e¤ect on economic policy. The economic ideology of the party ruling the polity
matters for the size of public provision of goods and the distribution of income among individu-
als. In particular, pro-government politicians promise larger public provision of goods and lower
net income than pro-market politicians. As a result, the composition of government spending be-
tween public goods and cash transfers depends on the ideology of the party that wins the election.
Furthermore, pro-government party commits to income taxation schedules that implement lower
income inequality than the schedules proposed by the right-wing party.
The main contribution of this paper consists on showing how ideological preferences over eco-
nomic policy can a¤ect the electoral competition among partisan politicians. Partisan citizens are
willing to trade their economic ideology for promises of higher income. In that case, pro-market
politicians make use of redistributive schedules to court moderate pro-leftist citizens and then
increase their expected number of votes. The availability of redistributive politics provides an elec-
toral advantage to pro-market politicians who exhibit a higher probability of winning elections.
This advantage implies that pro-government parties support larger ideological sacrices aiming to
avoid the victory of more distasteful policies from its opponent.
Political economy has put emphasis on how political institutions, in particular electoral rules,
a¤ect size and composition of government spending across countries.20 However, empirical research
by Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Shelton (2007) points out that there exists signicant variation
in the scope of government spending among countries with similar levels of economic development,
social and demographic features and even political institutions such as electoral rules. The theoret-
ical predictions raised in this paper suggest that economic ideological positions held by citizens and
politicians may be a complementary source to explain these disparities. That source of variation
has not been explored in the literature and constitutes a venue of future empirical research. It
would be worthwhile to test the existence of a partisanship e¤ect on the extent of public good
provision and the composition of public spending across countries. Nevertheless, it is important to
notice that the feasibility of this empirical research is seriously limited by the current availability
of microdata on individualspreferences over public good provision. It would be also necessary to
overcome the absence of data on parties ideological positions regarding government provision of
goods and services.21
20Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2001), Milessi-Ferreti et al. (2002) discuss the direct
e¤ect of electoral rules on politicians incentives to allocate public budgets; Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007)
examine the indirect e¤ect of electoral rules on government spending through party structure and the existence of
coalition governments.
21Little empirical work has been done to identify and estimate economic partisan preferences of political parties.
One exception is Kim and Fording (2002) who present measures of both partiesand governments ideologies based on
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One of the novel contributions of this paper is the existence of an electoral advantage when
partisan parties compete for o¢ ce. The analysis suggests that pro-government ideological posi-
tions could be more costly to pursue in terms of electoral feasibility. In contrast to the previous
contributions that examined the e¤ect of exogenous non-economic factors, this paper provides a
new source of electoral advantage which is directly related to economic policy and endogenous to
the political process. In further research, it would be interesting to test whether in majoritarian
systems right-wing parties exhibit higher chances of winning elections than parties which favor a
larger involvement of government in the public provision of goods, given that our models prediction
of an electoral advantage only applies to majoritarian systems. It might also be testable whether in
majoritarian systems the electoral advantage of pro-market ideological leanings yields lower public
provision of goods and larger income inequality.
Interesting further research could also be devoted to examining how the presence of di¤erent
dimensions of ideology a¤ect the chosen economic policy. In this paper, I investigated the case
in which individuals have ideology only over the role of government providing goods and services.
The analysis could be extended to include citizensdi¤erent views regarding the fair distribution
of income and the extent of inequality. Furthermore, the model might be enlarged to incorporate
the fact that some citizens vote taking into account mainly value issues (e.g. moral and religious
positions) represented by parties and they abstract away from economic policy proposals. It would
be interesting to analyze the simultaneous impact of both value issues and economic ideologies
on voter choices, implemented economic policies and political competition among parties. Further
research is necessary to analyze these extensions.
Party Manifesto Data provided by Budge et al.(2001). One of the main components included in politiciansideology
are their views on the economic role of government.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A. POLITICAL GAME
A.1. Swing voters
Given policy platforms, there might be citizens in group j with an idiosyncratic ideological
parameter, gjs , such that they are indi¤erent between voting for the pro-market, R, as for the
pro-government, L, party. The swing voter type in group j is implicitly dened by:
Vi(c
j
R; gR; g
j
s ) = Vi(c
j
L; gL; g
j
s ) + "
u(cjR) +W (gR; g
j
s ) = u(c
j
L) +W (gL; g
j
s ) + " (31)
For the case in which individualspreferences over public goods are represented by Euclidean
quadratic preferences, the swing voter type in group j can be obtained as follows:
u(cjR)  (gR   gi )2 = u(cjL)  (gL   gi )2 + "
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)]  g2R   gi 2 + 2gRgi =  g2L   gi 2 + 2gLgi + "
g2L   g2R + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] + 2gRgi   2gLgi   " = 0
(gL   gR)(gL + gR) + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] + gi 2(gR   gL)  " = 0
(gL   gR)(gL + gR) + [u(cjR)  u(cjL)]  " = gi 2(gL   gR)
Arranging terms, the ideological cut-o¤ type in group j is given by:
gjs =
(gL + gR)
2
+
1
2(gL   gR) [u(c
j
R)  u(cjL)] 
"
2(gL   gR) (32)
gjs = gLR +
1
2g
[u(cjR)  u(cjL)  "] (33)
where gLR is the average of partiespromises regarding public provision of goods and g is the
di¤erence between leftist and rightist proposals.
A.2. Vote Share
I assume that the idiosyncratic ideological parameter of individuals who belong to group j is
drawn from a uniform distribution, F j , over the range [gja ; gjb ]. Therefore, the fraction of citizens
who vote for party R in group j is given by:
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SjR(xR; xL) = F
j(gj) = j [gjs   gja ] = j [gjs   gja + gj   gj ] =
= j [gjs   gja +
gja + gjb
2
  gj ] = j [gjs +
gjb   gja
2
  gj ] =
= j [gjs   gj +
1
2j
]
=
1
2
+ j [gjs   gj ] (34)
Hence, the overall vote share for party R can be written as:
SR(xR; xL; ") =
JX
j=1
jF j(gj) =
1
2
+
JX
j=1
jj [gjs   gj ] (35)
The complement share of citizens, 1 
JP
j=1
jF j(gjs ), votes for pro-government party L; SL.
A.3. PartiesProbability of winning
Given that the expected value of the popularity shock is equal to zero, the expected swing
voters in group j are citizens with an ideological type, bgjs , such that they are indi¤erent between
partieseconomic policy proposals. Therefore, the expected cut-o¤ ideological type is given by:
E(gjs ) = bgjs = gLR + 12g [u(cjR)  u(cjL)] (36)
I assume majority voting and then winning the election corresponds to obtaining more than
fty per cent of the total vote. Given the expected swing voter type in each group and the assumed
uniform distribution of ideological types and popularity shock, the probability that pro-market
party R wins the election is obtained as follows:
P (xR; xL) = P (SR  1
2
) = P
0@1
2
+
JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj   "2g ]  12
1A (37)
= P
0@ JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj   "2g ]  0
1A = P
0@ JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj ]  JX
j=1
jj
"
2g
1A
= P
0@ JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj ]   "2g
1A = P
0BBB@"  2g
JP
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj ]

1CCCA
= G
0@2g

JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj ]
1A (38)
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Thus, pro-market partys probability of winning is given by:
P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+
 

2g
JX
j=1
jj [bgjs   gj ] (39)
Pro-government party anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability
1   P (xR; xL). Furthermore, the median ideological type, gm, and the expected swing voters
ideology in the overall population, bgs , are dened as:
gm =
JP
j=1
jjgj

and bgs =
JP
j=1
jjbgj

(40)
Hence, party Rs probability of winning can also be expressed as:
P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+  2g[bgs   gm] (41)
As an alternative, making use of (36) this probability can be written in terms of policy platforms
as:
P (xR; xL) =
1
2
+  
0BBB@
JP
j=1
jj [u(cjR)  u(cjL)]

+ 2g[gLR   gm]
1CCCA (42)
B. POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
B.1. Policy Choice Problem
Taking the opponents policy choice problem as given, each political party chooses a combination
of public good provision and net income for each group, xP = (gP ; cP ) for P 2 fR;Lg, that
maximizes its expected utility subject to economic feasibility and non-negativity constraints. Thus,
the policy choice problem of party R is given by:
max
gR;fcjRgJj=1
EUR(xR; xL) s.t. gR +
JX
j=1
jcjR = y and gR  0 ; cjR  0 8j (43)
Party L makes simultaneous policy announcenments and its policy choice problem is given by:
max
gL;fcjLgJj=1
EUL(xR; xL) s.t. gL +
JX
j=1
jcjL = y and gL  0 ; cjL  0 8j (44)
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The constrained optimization problems for parties R and L exhibit the following Lagrangeans:
$R(gR; c
1
R; :::; c
J
R;R) = P (xR; xL)[QR +WR(gR; g

R)] + [1  P (xR; xL)]WR(gL; gR) +
+R[y   gR  
JX
j=1
jcjR] + gRgR +
JX
j=1
jjcRc
j
R (45)
$L(gL; c
1
L; :::; c
J
L;L) = [1  P (xR; xL)][QL +WL(gL; gL)]] + P (xR; xL)WL(gR; gL) +
+L[y   gL  
JX
j=1
jcjL] + gLgL +
JX
j=1
jjcLc
j
L (46)
where P is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the economy feasibility constraint for P 2 fR;Lg;
and gP  0 and jcP are the multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints gP  0 and
cjP  0 for all groups j 2 f1; :::; Jg for P 2 fR;Lg.
The First Order Conditions for pro-market party for an interior optimum are given by:
[gR]
@P (xR; xL)
@gR
[QR +WR(gR; g

R) WR(gL; gR)] + P (xR; xL)
@WR(gR; g

R)
@gR
= R (47)
[cjR]
@P (xR; xL)
@cjR
[QR +WR(gR; g

R) WR(gL; gR)] = jR 8j (48)
The First Order Conditions for pro-government party for an interior optimum are given by:
[gL]   @P (xR; xL)
@gL
[QL +WL(gL; g

L) WL(gR; gL)] + [1  P (xR; xL)]
@WL(gL; g

L)
@gL
= L (49)
[cjL]  
@P (xR; xL)
@cjL
[QL +WL(gL; g

L) WL(gR; gL)] = jL 8j (50)
Let 
P denote party Ps benet of winning elections which is dened as the di¤erence between
the payo¤ under victory and defeat. Hence:

P = 
P (xR; xL) = QP +WP (gP ; g

P ) WP (g P ; gP ) (51)
B.2. Equilibrium Policy Divergence
The set of FOCs implicitly dene the best responses of each party as function of its opponents
strategy prole. When both candidates are playing their best responses there exists a Nash Equi-
librium in which neither candidate has an incentive to o¤er an alternative policy. Therefore, a Nash
Equilibrium of the policy announcement stage, (xNR ; x
N
L ), is a solution to the system of equations
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consisting of partiesFOCs and their budget constraints. In the examined political game, we have
k = J + 1 FOCs and a budget constraint for each candidate. Hence, the Nash equilibrium in the
rst stage of the game is the solution to the following system of equations and parties budget
constraints:
@P (xNR ;x
N
L )
@gR

NR
R
+
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@WR(g
N
R ;g

R)
@gR
R
= 1 (52)
@P (xNR ;x
N
L )
@cjR

NR
R
= j 8 j (53)
 @P (xNR ;xNL )@gL 
NL
L
+
[1  P (xNR ; xNL )]@WL(g
N
L ;g

L)
@gL
L
= 1 (54)
 @P (xNR ;xNL )
@cjL

NL
L
= j 8 j (55)
B.3. Equilibrium Income Taxation Schedules
Consider the equilibrium FOCs for net income promised to group j by party R (48) and party
L (50). Given these conditions, the equilibrium allocation of net income across groups promised by
party P satises:
1
k
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@ckP

NP =
1
k0
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@ck
0
P

NP 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg (56)
By (39) the change in partiesprobability of winning because of marginal increase in group js
net income is given by:
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@cjR
=  
jj

uc(c
jN
R ) and
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@cjL
=   
jj

uc(c
jN
L ) 8 j (57)
Hence, equilibrium distribution of net income satises:
kuc(c
kN
P ) = 
k0uc(c
k0N
P ) 8 k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fR;Lg (58)
B.4. Equilibrium Public Goods Provision
By (39) the changes in partiesprobability of winning because of marginal increase in public
goods provision are given by:
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gR
=   2(gNR   gm) and
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gL
=  2(gNL   gm) (59)
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In the particular case that preferences over public goods are quadratic, the e¤ect in ideological
well-being because of marginal changes in policy platforms are given by:
@WR(g
N
R ; g

R)
@gR
=  2(gNR   gR) and
@WL(g
N
L ; g

L)
@gL
=  2(gNL   gL) (60)
Consider party Rs equilibrium FOCs for public goods (47) and net income promised to group
j (48). When voters and politicians exhibit quadratic preferences, equilibrium conditions satisfy:
  2(gNR   gm)
NR   2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL ) = R (61)
 j
j

uc(c
jN
R )

N
R = 
jR 8 j (62)
The equilibrium conditions for party L satisfy:
  2(gNL   gm)
NL   2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )] = L (63)
 j
j

uc(c
jN
L )

N
L = 
jR 8 j (64)
Taking (61) and (62), party Rs equilibrium choice between allocating one unit of income to
public goods provision and to net income to group k satises:
  2(gNR   gm)
NR   2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL ) =
1
k
k

k uc(c
kN
R )

N
R 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg (65)
Similarly, the equilibrium policy choice for party L satises:
  2(gNL   gm)
NL   2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )] =
1
k
k

k uc(c
kN
L )

N
L 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg (66)
Simplifying and arranging terms, (65) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gm)  2(gNR   gR)
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
 
NR
= kuc(c
kN
R ) 8 k (67)
The weighted average of the density of group-specic distributions of ideological preferences
was dened as:
 =
JX
j=1
jj (68)
Given the equilibrium relative treatment in terms of net income (58), we obtain:
j
k
=
uc(c
kN
R )
uc(c
jN
R )
8 j; k 2 f1; :::; Jg (69)
Making use of both the denition (68) and the relation (69), equilibrium condition (67) can be
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written as:
JX
j=1
j
j
k
 2(gNR   gm)
uc(ckNR )
+
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
 
NR
JX
j=1
j
j
k
 2(gNR   gR)
uc(ckNR )
= 1 (70)
JX
j=1
j
uc(c
kN
R )
uc(c
jN
R )
 2(gNR   gm)
uc(ckNR )
+
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
 
NR
JX
j=1
j
uc(c
kN
R )
uc(c
jN
R )
 2(gNR   gR)
uc(ckNR )
= 1 (71)
JX
j=1
j
 2(gNR   gm)
uc(c
jN
R )
+
P (xNR ; x
N
L )
 
NR
JX
j=1
j
 2(gNR   gR)
uc(c
jN
R )
= 1 (72)
Given the assumption on available technology to provide public goods, the marginal rate of
transformation between income and public goods, MRTg;c, is equal to one. Furthermore, given
party Rs platform, the marginal rate of substitution between public goods and net income for
individuals in group j with median ideological type, MRSjg

m
gR;cR , and ideological position of party
R, MRS
jgR
gR;cR , are given by:
MRSjg

m
gR;cR
=
 2(gNR   gm)
uc(c
jN
R )
and MRS
jgR
gR;cR =
 2(gNR   gR)
uc(c
jN
R )
8 j (73)
Hence, party Rs equilibrium condition can be written as:
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
gR;cR
+ NR
JX
j=1
jMRS
jgR
gR;cR =MRTg;c (74)
where NR =
P (xNR ;x
N
L )
 
NR
; and equilibrium 
NR is given by:

NR = Q+ 2
N
g (g
N
LR   gR) (75)
The equilibrium condition for party L can be obtained following the same steps, and therefore
it can be written as:
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
gL;cL
+ NL
JX
j=1
jMRS
jgL
gL;cL =MRTg;c (76)
where NL =
[1 P (xNR ;xNL )]
 
NL
; and equilibrium 
NL is given by:

NL = Q+ 2
N
g (g

L   gNLR) (77)
The system of equations formed by (74), (76) and the feasibility constraints for both parties
simultaneously determine equilibrium policy platforms (cNR ; g
N
R ) and (c
N
L ; g
N
L ).
In the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of expected swing
voters (j =  8j), both political parties implement income taxation schedules that implement an
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egalitarian distribution of income (cj NR = c
N and cj NL = c
N 8j). Thus, the system of equations
that simultaneously determine equilibrium policy platforms can be written as:
MRSg

m
gR;cR
+ NRMRS
gR
gR;cR =MRTg;c (78)
MRSg

m
gL;cL
+ NLMRS
gL
gL;cL =MRTg;c (79)
B. 5. Electoral Advantage Party R
In equilibrium, the expected indi¤erent swing voter in group j, bgjNs , is implictly dened by:
u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) =W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (80)
In equilibrium, net income in group j promised by party R is larger than the income that results
from party Ls platform, therefore expected swing votersprivate well-being is larger under party
Rs income taxation policy platform:
cjNR > c
jN
L ! u(cjNR )  u(cjNL ) > 0 8 j (81)
In equilibrium, party L commits to larger public goods proposals than party R, gNL > g
N
R .
Therefore, according to (80), in equilibrium, swing votersideological utility loss under party Ls
proposal is lower than the ideological loss implied by party Rs proposal:
W (gNL ; bgjNs ) W (gNR ; bgjNs ) > 0 8 j (82)
Expected swing voters are indi¤erent between the ideological benets associated to party Ls
victory and the larger private economic well-being if party R wins the election. Therefore, in equi-
librium the ideological positions of expected swing voters in group j are closer to pro-government
party Ls ideological leanings than to pro-market Rs positions. In this case, the ideology of the
equilibrium indi¤erent type in any group is larger than the median ideological position in the overall
population: bgjNs > gm 8 j ! bgNs > gm (83)
This shows that in each group there exists a subset of citizens biased toward the pro-government
ideology who are expected to vote for the pro-market party. Thus, in equilibrium the probability
that party R wins elections is larger than one-half:
P (xNR ; x
N
L ) > 1=2 (84)
B.6. Ideological Sacrice Party L
The equilibrium expected swing voter type in group j can be written as:
31
bgjNS = gLR + 12g [u(cjNR )  u(cjNL )] (85)
Di¤erentiating (85) with respect to gR and gL yields:
dbgjNS
dgR
=
1
2
+
u(cjNR )  u(cjNL )
22g
(86)
dbgjNS
dgL
=
1
2
  u(c
jN
R )  u(cjNL )
22g
(87)
In equilibrium each party balances its policy preferences and its chances of winning elections
and therefore the electoral returns of policy platforms are not exhausted. This implies that the
sign of both (86) and (87) is positive. Hence, the impact of public goods platforms changes in
the equilibrium expected indi¤erent voter type is larger for the right-wing than for the left-wing
proposal:
dbgjNS
dgR
>
dbgjNS
dgL
(88)
This result shows that the variation in the expected vote share in every group if the right-wing
party would raise its public provision of goods is larger than the expected change when the left-wing
party would reduce its level of public provision. This therefore implies that the e¤ect of these policy
changes on equilibrium probability of winning elections would be larger for the pro-market party
than for the pro-government party.
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gR
>
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gL
(89)
The changes in partiesequilibrium probability of winning elections because of marginal changes
in public goods provision are given by:
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gR
=   2(gNR   gm) > 0 and
@P (xNR ; x
N
L )
@gL
=  2(gNL   gm) > 0 (90)
Given (89) and (90), the concavity of the probability function implies that the distance between
the right-wing public good equilibrium proposal with respect to the median ideological position is
larger than the distance of the later position with respect to the equilibrium platform proposed by
the left-wing party:
jgNR   gmj > jgNL   gmj (91)
By assumption, there is not aggregate ideological bias in the overall population. Ideological
positions of political parties are symmetrically located around the median ideological position:
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jgR   gmj = jgL   gmj (92)
Hence, given (91) and (92), the equilibrium ideological sacrice of pro-government party is
larger than the equilibrium sacrice of pro-market party.
zNL > z
N
R (93)
C. COMPARATIVE STATICS
C.1. Electoral Uncertainty
In the limit case in which  ! 0 (i.e. huge electoral uncertainty), party Rs equilibrium
condition (65) can be written as:
 2(gNR   gR)P (xNR ; xNL )! 0 (94)
Similarly, given (66), party Ls equilibrium condition is given by:
 2(gNL   gL)[1  P (xNR ; xNL )]! 0 (95)
Furthermore, when  ! 0, the equilibrium probability that party R wins elections tends to
one-half. Therefore, given (94) and (95), partiesequilibrium public goods proposals tends to their
respective ideological bliss points:
gNR ! gR and gNL ! gL (96)
Both parties exhibit the same chances of winning elections, i.e. P (xNR ; x
N
L ) = 1=2, and parties
platforms do not support ideological sacrice, zNR = z
N
L = 0.
C.2. Private Benets of winning
When partiesprivate benets associated to win elections are huge (i.e. Q ! 1), equilibrium
conditions (74) and (76) can be written as:
JX
j=1
j
 2(gNP   gm)
uc(c
jN
P )
! 1 then
JX
j=1
jMRSjg

m
g;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (97)
Therefore, in equilibrium, when Q ! 1 both politicial parties tend to converge to the same
economic policy platform (i.e. gN = gNR = g
N
L and c
j N = cjNR = c
jN
L 8j). The equilibrium
distribution of net income across groups is characterized by (58). Furthermore, the equilibrium
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public goods provision and income taxation schedules tend to converge towards the weighted average
of the preferred policy of individuals located in group j with median ideological type.
In the particular case in which all groups exhibit the same concentration of expected swing
voters (j =  8j), both political parties implement income taxation schedules that yield an
egalitarian distribution of income (cj N = cN 8j). Partiesequilibrium policy platform satises:
 2(gNP   gm)
uc(cN )
! 1 then MRSgmg;c !MRTg;c 8P 2 fR;Lg (98)
Both political parties tend to converge towards the preferred public good policy of the median
ideological type. Furthermore, when political parties converge to the same policy platforms, indi-
viduals are expected to be indi¤erent between parties. Thus, the equilibrium probability that party
R wins elections tends to one-half.
D. UTILITARIAN ALLOCATION
The utilitarian social welfare function (UW ) integrates over all individualsutilitiy functions:
UW 
JX
j=1
j
"Z gjb
gja
V (cj ; g; gi )
jdgi
#
(99)
=
JX
j=1
j
"Z gjb
gja
[u(cj) +W (g; gi )]
jdgi
#
=
JX
j=1
ju(cj) +
JX
j=1
j
Z gjb
gja
W (g; gi )]
jdgi (100)
A benevolent utilitarian government maximizes (100) subject to the economy feasibility con-
straint. The Lagrangean for the constrained optimization problem is given by:
$U =
JX
j=1
ju(cj) +
JX
j=1
j
Z gjb
gja
W (g; gi )
jdgi + 
24y   g   JX
j=1
jcj
35 (101)
The First Order Conditions for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj ] juc(c
j) = j ! uc(cj) =  8j (102)
[g]   2(g   g) =  !Wg(g; g) =  (103)
Considering (102), the distribution of net income across groups satises:
uc(c
k
U ) = uc(c
k0
U ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (104)
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Furthermore, the utilitarian allocation of resources satises:
Wg(gU ; g
)
uc(cU )
= 1!MRSgg;c =MRTg;c (105)
Therefore, a benevolent utilitarian government implements an egalitarian distribution of income
and the level of public goods provision preferred by individuals with average ideology.
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